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Abstract
We report an experiment designed to test the inﬂuence of
noisy commitments on eﬃciency in a simple bargaining game.
We investigate two diﬀerent levels of commitment reliability in a
variant of the peasant-dictator game. Theoretical analysis sug-
gests that the reliability of commitments in this game does not
aﬀect eﬃciency. We ﬁnd that accurate commitments promote
eﬃciency, as expected by game theory. However, noisy commit-
ments are found to impair eﬃciency. We explain this eﬀect by the
diﬀerences between incentives oﬀ the equilibrium path under con-
ditions of accurate commitments and noisy commitments. This
diﬀerence changes the game structure and in the current game
facilitates more random responses.
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11 Trust and information
Many economic interactions involve “trust games” (see Kreps, 1990;
Berg et al., 1995). Whenever a hold-up problem (see Hart, 1995) is
non-contractible, trading partners who have to make speciﬁc investments
simply have to trust counterparts and run the risk that their counterparts
will act opportunistically. There is a tension between the production or
investment decision and the decision about how to share the gains of
production. The former decision aﬀects the eﬃciency of an interaction,
whereas the latter one aﬀects the distribution of gains among interaction
partners. Unfortunately, distributional issues challenge eﬃciency issues.
Economic eﬃciency is maximized when the players trust each other, but
rational considerations are expected to lead traders to refrain from choos-
ing the eﬃcient investment. Recent research suggests that this problem
can be addressed by providing information about the likely behavior of
the diﬀerent agents (see Lucking-Reiley et al., 1999; Burnham et al.,
2000; Bolton et al., 2004). As demonstrated by van Huyck et al. (1995),
this type of information is particularly eﬀective when it involves early
commitments. In a series of laboratory experiments, van Huyck et al.
show for the peasant-dictator game that an early commitment indeed
improves eﬃciency.
The main goal of the current research is to improve our understanding
of the eﬀect of early commitments on trust and eﬃciency. Speciﬁcally,
we focus on the eﬀect of noisy information about early commitments on
investments and the implications for the eﬃciency of production. In the
peasant-dictator game (van Huyck et al., 1995), a peasant endowed with
beans can either consume them or plant them in a ﬁeld, leading to gross
rates greater than one. However, there is a dictator who taxes the peas-
ant’s harvest. A strategic analysis predicts that an early commitment
will facilitate eﬃciency, and the party who is entitled to commit prior
to the investment decision will receive all the surplus from the produc-
tion. Yet, how does the noisy transmission of commitments aﬀect the
division of production gains? We address this question by studying a
variant of the peasant-dictator game in which a dictator sends a message
concerning the share of beans that he will leave for the peasant. This
commitment, however, is not always accurate. It is possible that the
true share of production committed to the peasant will be lower than
the received signal about the commitment.
Our interest in the eﬀect of noise on early commitments stems from
two observations. First, many interesting examples of natural commit-
ment devices are likely to be noisy. Consider, for an example, the sig-
niﬁcant proportion of divorces after marriage. In many cases they occur
because unforeseen events impair the parties’ ability to fulﬁll their early
2commitments. Similarly, a restaurant that commits to a certain quality
of food may not be able to provide the promised quality should its fa-
mous chef become ill. The accuracy of information may be also impaired
by noisy transmissions, such as recommendations in tourist guides that
might overestimate the quality of restaurants. Somehow, recommenda-
tions tend to bias information positively.1 One may also consider rep-
utation systems for online sellers like those on eBay or Amazon. Most
sellers have extraordinary reputation scores, but this says little about the
accuracy of this recommendation. Therefore, in our analysis we stress
the eﬀect of – potentially – positively contaminated information on trade
eﬃciency.
Second, whereas a theoretical analysis of our game suggests an equi-
librium, irrespective of the level of noise, relevant behavioral studies
can lead to contradicting predictions concerning the eﬀect of noise on
early commitments. One line of research demonstrates the importance
of fairness in bargaining games (Rabin, 1993; Fehr & Schmidt, 1999;
Bolton & Ockenfels, 2000). Yet, as mentioned earlier, distributional
issues challenge eﬃciency issues. Thus, fairness concerns may cause
eﬃciency losses. According to this line of research, for accurate com-
mitments (i.e., commitment transmission which is not subject to noise)
peasants refrain from eﬃcient levels of investments when commitments
violate their fairness concerns. Therefore, conﬂicting fairness norms lead
to ineﬃciency, e.g., dictators in the peasant-dictator game may consider
splitting the entire pie equally to be fair, while peasants expect an equal
split of the production surplus. We show that noise reduces the number
of conﬂicting fairness norms. Consequently, noise decreases the range of
commitments causing ineﬃcient investments. If commitments become
noisy, eﬃciency is enhanced. Another line of research suggests that noise
changes the structure of the game because it changes the incentives for
behavior oﬀ the equilibrium path (Prasnikar & Roth, 1992; Andreoni et
al., 2002). This research implies that, because of such changes, noise will
take players away from the equilibrium, towards a random choice. As
a consequence, noise takes players away from the eﬃcient equilibrium
path and reduces eﬃciency. Hence contradictory predictions are derived
from the existing literature.
The results of our laboratory experiments indicate that fairness con-
cerns are indeed very important for players who have to commit them-
selves. This observation is not aﬀected by the accuracy of information.
However, the behavior of players who have to investment diﬀers in ac-
1A restaurant that is underestimated by the writer of the tourist guide is not
included in the guide at all. The reason is that typically the guide’s purpose is to
recommend high quality restaurants.
3cordance with the accuracy of the information. Pure selﬁsh concerns
direct investment decisions when commitments are accurately conveyed,
whereas behavior is less structured when commitments are noisily con-
veyed. We show that this eﬀect is caused by the diﬀerent incentives oﬀ
the equilibrium path for noisy commitment transmission such that noisy
commitments impair eﬃciency.
This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces the model of
the peasant-dictator game with a commitment mechanism and develops
the theoretical predictions for optimal behavior in this game. Section 3
elaborates hypotheses for the game in more detail and discusses counter-
arguments. Section 4 reports the experimental design and discusses the
results of the laboratory experiments. Section 5 concludes the paper
with a discussion of the results.
2 A model of noisy commitments
Our analysis relies on the peasant-dictator game, as introduced by van
Huyck et al. (1995) and on the investment game (Berg et al., 1995). In
both games, an investment is highly eﬃcient, but at the risk of being
exploited by the opponent. Two players, A and B, interact, where A (the
peasant) receives an initial endowment IA. Player A has the opportunity
to send any amount aIA for 0 ≤ a ≤ 1 to player B. The amount sent
is tripled before it reaches B (the dictator). Player B decides to return
any fraction b of the amount for 0 ≤ b ≤ 1. Thus, player B returns the
amount b3aIA to A and keeps (1 − b)3aIA for himself. Consequently,
player B earns (1 − b)3aIA, while A earns the returned amount plus
what he did not send (i.e., (1 − a + 3ab)IA). The entire mechanism of
the game is known to both players. Of course, the rational behavior of B
implies b = 0. Since A anticipates this, the subgame perfect equilibrium
of the peasant-dictator game/investment game is a = 0 and b = 0. No
investment occurs. In order to facilitate investments, van Huyck et al.
(1995) modify the game, adding a commitment stage. As a result, the
peasant-dictator game with a commitment mechanism consists of three
consecutive stages. In t = 1, player B has to commit to a return rate
b. In t = 2, the commitment is transferred to A. Thus A can condition
her share a on the return rate b indicated by player B. Finally, in t = 3,
payoﬀs are realized.
Proposition 1: The weak Nash equilibrium of the peasant-dictator game
with a commitment mechanism is a = 1 and b = 1
3.
Proof: see Appendix.
However, the commitment is conveyed through a noisy transmission
mechanism; this implies that the true commitment is not necessarily
4conveyed.2 Denoting the received signal by sba, we introduce a noise
mechanism as
sba =
(
b with probability 1
2
min{1,b + β} with probability 1
2
(1)
for a commonly known β. Particularly for the following, we restrict
the degree of potential contamination to β ∈ (1
3,1]. We consider only
substantial noise, i.e., noise that even contaminates the commitment of
b = 0 such that it appears acceptable. Thus, there is no “obvious” range
of unacceptable commitments from the outset. Furthermore, we want
to emphasize that this mechanism implies only positively biased signals,
i.e., signals that are potentially higher than the true value of b.3 One
can think of restaurant recommendations that potentially overestimate
the quality of meals. Therefore, the peasant-dictator game with a noisy
commitment mechanism consists of four consecutive stages. In t = 0,
nature ﬁrst chooses sba according to equation (1). In t = 1, player B,
who does not know nature’s move, commits herself to return a fraction
b. In t = 2, player A receives the signal sba and decides about a. Finally,
in t = 3, payoﬀs are realized. Of course, since we modiﬁed the peasant-
dictator game such that players face a dynamic game with incomplete
information, for optimal behavior it is important to consider players’ be-
liefs. Potentially, player B can abuse the noisy commitment mechanism
in such a way that she commits herself to return less to player A than
player A invested. However, the theoretical analysis yields a diﬀerent
result.
Proposition 2: Sequential rational belief formation in the peasant-
dictator game with a noisy commitment mechanism yields the following
for any pair of commitments b and b, such that b ∈ [0, 1
3) and b = b+β:
a) for b ≤ 1−2β, the choice of b weakly dominates b. Therefore, player
A, who receives a signal sba ∈ [β,1 − β], chooses a = 1 with probability
1.
b) for b > 1−2β, the choice of b dominates b if Λ >
1−b−β
β , while b weakly
dominates b if Λ ≤
1−b−β
β , where Λ denotes player B’s belief that player
2Of course, committing oneself to a future action also creates a strategic advantage
(Schelling, 1960) such that the committing party receives all the surplus. Bagwell
(1995) shows that even a low level of stochastic noise eliminates this advantage.
An experimental analysis of Bagwell’s suggestion shows that Bagwell’s result holds
for the ﬁrst round, but, as experience increases, the ﬁrst-mover advantage emerges
even in the presence of noise (Huck & M¨ uller, 2000). Note that we assume a noise
mechanism such that the ﬁrst-mover advantage survives noisy transmission.
3It is possible to consider other noise mechanisms that also allow for the uniform
or normal distribution of noise; these were analyzed in Bagwell (1995).
5A will choose a > 0, responding to a signal sba = b + β = b. Therefore,
player A, who receives a signal sba ∈ (1 − β, 1
3 + β), will choose a = 1
with probability
1−b−β
β , and choose a = 0 with probability
b+2β−1
β .
Proof: see Appendix.
With respect to observation 2, we can conclude that it does not pay
for player B to abuse the noisy commitment mechanism. However, for
a certain range of commitments, player A will invest a = 1 only with a
probability smaller than one. In the framework of our example, it does
not pay for restaurant owners – who know that tourist guides potentially
overestimate meal quality – to have low quality meals and speculate on
a noisy transmission of commitments. Only if restaurant owners be-
lieve that tourists are very likely to follow the guide’s recommendation,
and do not decrease the probability of following recommendations for
high quality restaurants, is it proﬁtable to imitate an excellent restau-
rant. Yet, the further theoretical analysis shows that abusing the noisy
commitment mechanism is not an optimal strategy.
Proposition 3: The weak Nash equilibrium of the peasant-dictator game
with a noisy commitment mechanism is a = 1 and b = 1
3.4
Proof: see Appendix.
Consequently, the equilibrium prediction remains unchanged for the
peasant-dictator game with the commitment mechanism and the peasant-
dictator game with the noisy commitment mechanism.5 Thus it is prof-
itable for restaurant owners to choose to oﬀer reasonable restaurant qual-
ity rather than to speculate on a noisy transmission of commitments. As
a consequence, the game with the noisy commitment mechanism enables
us to observe the “pure” behavioral response of players to a noisy trans-
mission mechanism.
3 Hypotheses
For laboratory experiments, we chose two degrees of noise as treatment
conditions, β = 0 (no-noise) and β = 0.4 (noise). We refer to trust-
worthy commitments as commitments b ≥ 0.34 of player B, i.e., player
B returns at least the amount of money she has received from player
A, while commitments b < 0.34 are deﬁned as untrustworthy. Conse-
quently, we refer to player B as the trustee. Likewise, we refer to player
A as the trustor. We deﬁne trust as a situation in which the trustor
chooses a = 1 as a response to a signal sba ∈ (0.6,0.73]. Please note that
we refer to signals within this interval as problematic since, by propo-
sition 2, this interval characterizes the signals where trustors have to
4Of course, we have to stress that this result holds only for β ∈ (1
3,1].
5The ﬁrst-mover advantage survives the introduction of a noisy commitment
mechanism.
6choose a = 1 with a probability smaller than 1 in order to preserve the
dominance of trustworthy commitments. Particularly, the probability to
invest decreases from 0.975 for sba = 0.61 to 0.675 for sba = 0.73. Hence,
for the noise condition, we ﬁnd four levels of signals, one untrustwor-
thy, one problematic, and two trustworthy levels, whereas the no-noise
condition creates signals at an untrustworthy and a trustworthy level.
Figure 1 shows the boundaries of these levels.
 
trustworthy  untrustworthy 
sba 
0.33  1  0.6  0.73  0 
no noise 
noise 
trustworthy  problematic  untrustworthy  trustworthy 
Figure 1: Accuracy of signals
Of course, theory predicts that trustors will choose a = 0 for un-
trustworthy signals, while a = 1 for trustworthy signals. Moreover,
given proposition 2, for problematic signals we expect that they will
choose a = 1 with some probability smaller than 1. As a consequence,
trustees will choose the smallest commitment among the trustworthy
commitments. Thus, applying proposition 1 to the no-noise condition
and proposition 3 to the noise condition, we assume that noisy signals
will not change the equilibrium path of the game. The strategic analysis
of both treatment conditions predicts that trustees will choose b = 0.34
and trustors will respond by investing a = 1 for both conditions. There-
fore, for both conditions, investment occurs in such a manner that we
can state the rational hypothesis
Hratio: There is no diﬀerence in the eﬃciency of production between the
noise condition and the no-noise condition.
However, the theoretical solution to the game relies on strong as-
sumptions concerning individual rationality. One can easily think of
other scenarios that relax this strong precondition. Reconsidering the
peasant-dictator game with the commitment mechanism, we ﬁnd some
7similarities to ultimatum bargaining (G¨ uth et al., 1982), i.e., trustees
oﬀer a share of a pie, which trustors accept or reject. Thus, it seems
plausible to assume that fairness considerations inﬂuence trustees’ and
trustors’ decisions. However, at least there are two relevant fairness
norms applicable here. One could ask for an equal split of the produc-
tion or for an equal split of the surplus of production. It has been well
documented that multiple possible foci for fairness judgements result in
a self-serving bias (Babcock et al., 1996), i.e., subjects select a fairness
standard which favors themselves. Therefore, it seems plausible to as-
sume that trustees would commit themselves to an equal split of the pie,
i.e., b = 0.5, while trustors would expect an equal split of the production
surplus, i.e., b = 0.66, to be fair. Thus, under the no-noise condition,
trustors will choose a = 1 if sba ≥ 0.66. Lower signals trigger conﬂicts
between trustors and trustees about the fair division of payoﬀs, and,
as a consequence, may cause eﬃciency losses. However, for the noise
condition, we argue that the acceptance of the equal split of the pie is
increased. Earlier studies have shown that the set of alternatives cru-
cially inﬂuences fairness norms (e.g., Falk, Fehr & Fischbacher, 2003).
Notice that the commitment suggesting the equal split of the surplus
potentially leads to a problematic signal. Hence, there is an “obvious”
reason for trustees to consider the fairness norm of b = 0.5. As a result,
the acceptance rate of trustors for the equal split of the pie increases.
Overall, more investment occurs under the noise condition. For the fair-
ness hypothesis, we predict
Hfair: Production is more eﬃcient under the noise condition than under
the no-noise condition.
In contrast to the ﬁrst hypothesis, the oﬀ equilibrium hypothesis pre-
dicts that noise will have a negative eﬀect on eﬃciency. In particular,
noise will not facilitate investments, as suggested by the fairness hypoth-
esis. On the contrary, it predicts that noise will move responses away
from the rational equilibrium towards randomness. The reason for this
eﬀect is that noise changes the incentives for behavior oﬀ the equilib-
rium path, and these changes are expected to increase confusion. More
speciﬁcally, we assume that players engage in some kind of reinforcement
learning (e.g., Roth & Erev, 1995) in order to adjust their investments
and commitments in the course of the game. Activities which have
been chosen successfully in the past are reinforced, i.e., played more
frequently than those which have been less successful. Hence, invest-
ments are reinforced if commitments are trustworthy; no investments
are reinforced if commitments are untrustworthy. However, both un-
trustworthy and trustworthy commitments are reinforced if investments
occur. Under the no-noise condition, untrustworthy signals are certainly
8detected and not reinforced since trustors choose a = 0; by contrast in-
vestments for trustworthy signals are reinforced. Consequently, behavior
converges to the eﬃcient outcome. However, if commitments are noisily
transferred under the noise condition, untrustworthy commitments are
potentially reinforced by investments. Therefore, it is harder for trustors
and trustees to diﬀerentiate between the expected values for the diﬀer-
ent signals. This confusion will lead to less investment, and thus behav-
ior will shift away from the eﬃcient equilibrium. Correspondingly, the
oﬀ-equilibrium hypothesis predicts that noisy commitments will reduce
investments in the long run.
Hoff: In the course of the experiment, the eﬃciency of production de-
creases under the noise condition, while eﬃciency increases under the
no-noise condition.
Next, we elaborate on the method used to examine the speciﬁed
predictions and the results of this examination.
4 Experimental design and results
The experiment took place at the computer lab at the Israel Institute of
Technology (Technion), Haifa, in May 2005. For experiments, we used
zTree software (Fischbacher, 1999). Participants were either of type A
or B for the entire experiment, but played anonymously in each round
with a new partner of the alternative type. As an initial endowment,
we choose IA = 12 Israeli Sheqels (about 2.3 US dollars). In addi-
tion, both players received a show up fee of 10 Sheqels. In total, 64
subjects – mostly undergraduate students in their ﬁrst or second year
– participated. Before the experiment began, participants were asked
to answer a short questionnaire to ensure that they understood the in-
structions. Participants needed approximately 25 minutes to play six
repeated peasant-dictator games with a commitment mechanism, where
the noise parameter was constant for the entire sequence of the experi-
ment. However, only one randomly determined period was payoﬀ rele-
vant. Participants received an average payment of 22 Sheqels (with the
payment ranging from 12 to 38 Sheqels).
Figure 2 oﬀers a general overview of commitments b throughout the
experiment. As one can see, under the noise condition, the median
commitment decreases in the course of the experiment. However, there
is a broad range of commitments for both conditions, which remains
throughout the course of the experiment. Furthermore, it is obvious that
trustees deviate from the game theoretical prediction for the no-noise
and the noise condition. Indeed, a statistical analysis of the median b
(0.5, with mean absolute diﬀerence 0.148 for the no-noise condition, 0.4,
with mean absolute diﬀerence 0.148 for the noise condition) indicates
9a signiﬁcant deviation from the theoretical prediction.6 Therefore, we
can already reject the rational commitments of trustees. However, we
cannot ﬁnd any signiﬁcant diﬀerence between commitments.7
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Figure 2: player B commitments by period
Consequently, trustors’ behavior also deviates from the equilibrium
prediction. Examining the investment a, Figure 3 shows the median
values (the median absolute deviations) for the diﬀerent levels of sig-
nals. Overall, we ﬁnd a median a (median absolute deviation of a) of
1 (0) for the no-noise condition and 0.5 (0.74) for the noise condition.
It seems that trustors rationally invest in the no-noise condition. With
respect to rational investment in the noise condition, we ﬁnd that for
sba < 0.34 and sba ≥ 0.74, trustors indeed behave in accordance with
theoretical prediction. Moreover, for these two levels of signals, there
is no signiﬁcant diﬀerence in the investments under these conditions.8
Thus the data supports the view that trustors invest rationally. How-
ever, trustors respond very diﬀerently to signals for 0.34 ≤ sba < 0.61
and for 0.61 ≤ sba < 0.74 under diﬀering conditions. Under the noisy
6p < 0.001 for both conditions; Wilcoxon signed rank test, two-sided.
7p = 0.65 testing equality; Wilcoxon signed rank test, two-sided.
8p = 0.16; Wilcoxon rank-sum test, two-sided for sba < 0.34 and p = 0.397;
Wilcoxon rank-sum test, two-sided for sba ≥ 0.74.
10condition, they neither choose a = 1 for 0.34 ≤ sba < 0.61 nor do they
mix a = 0 and a = 1 for 0.61 ≤ sba < 0.74. Rather, trustors invest only
some proportion of their endowment in response to such commitments.
This ﬁnding is a ﬁrst indicator of the trustors’ confusion under the noise
treatment. Another indicator is the increased variance in trustors’ re-
sponses to noisy commitments compared to their responses under the
no-noise condition. These observations conﬁrm with the oﬀ-equilibrium
hypothesis. It seems that players are confused by the introduction of
noisy commitments and act more randomly.
 
1 (0)  0 (0) 
sba 
0.33  1  0.6  0.73  0 
no noise 
noise 
0.33 (0.309)  0.83 (0.247)  0 (0)  1 (0) 
Figure 3: Median a (median absolute deviation of a) for diﬀerent signals
For a more detailed analysis of the response of investments on signals,
we deﬁne the following dummy variables. Let
δtr =
(
1 if sba is trustworthy,
0 otherwise,
and δtime =
(
1 if period > 4
0 otherwise.
Further, we characterize
δeq1 =
(
1 if sba ≥ 0.5
0 otherwise,
and δeq2 =
(
1 if sba ≥ 0.66
0 otherwise.
Finally, for data from the noise condition, we deﬁne
δprob =
(
1 if sba is problematic,
0 otherwise.
(2)
11We estimate the investment level a as the dependent variable in the
simple linear regression model. For data from the no-noise condition, we
test
a = x0 + x1δtr + x2δeq1 + x3δeq2 + x5δtr × δtime, (3)
while for data from the noise condition, we test
a = x0 + x1δtr + x2δeq1 + x4δprob + x5δtr × δtime + x6δprob × δtime. (4)
For both models, the absolute term x0 characterizes the uncondi-
tional investment, even for untrustworthy signals. Of course, all theories
predict x0 = 0, yet purely altruistic reasons render x0 > 0 (e.g., Forsythe
et al, 1994).
According to the rational hypothesis, for equation (3), we predict a
coeﬃcient x1 = 1, while x2, x3, and x5 have no signiﬁcant inﬂuence.
To the contrary, if (at least) some fairness concerns matter for trustors,
for equation (3), we should ﬁnd that coeﬃcients x2 ≤ 1, x3 = 1, and
x1 and x5 have no signiﬁcance. The oﬀ-equilibrium hypothesis predicts
that an increase in investments will correspond with trustworthy sig-
nals in the course of the experiment since trustworthy commitments are
reinforced. Therefore, we expect more investment as a response to trust-
worthy signals in late periods, i.e., δtime = 1, than in early periods of the
experiment. Consequently, we predict x1 = 1, x5 > 0, and that x2 and
x3 will be insigniﬁcant.
For the estimation of equation (4), the rational hypothesis predicts
coeﬃcients x1 = 1, while x4 < 1 due to the optimal mix between in-
vestments and no investments in response to problematic signals. Other
coeﬃcients have no signiﬁcant eﬀects. Again, if fairness concerns matter
for investment decisions, we ﬁnd the coeﬃcients x2 = 1, and there are no
signiﬁcant eﬀects for the other coeﬃcients. In accordance with the oﬀ-
equilibrium hypothesis, it is expected that untrustworthy commitments
will be reinforced. Whereas trustworthy and problematic signals are only
rewarded by some investment, i.e., x1 < 1 and x4 < 1, less investment
is observed as a response to both problematic and trustworthy signals
at the end of the experiment, i.e., x5 < 0 and x6 < 0. Finally, other
coeﬃcients have no signiﬁcant eﬀects. Table 1 shows the results for the
estimation of equation (3) and (4).9
The results for the no-noise model support the oﬀ-equilibrium hypoth-
esis. Conﬁrming earlier experimental results by van Huyck et al. (1995),
9Standard errors in parenthesis;∗∗∗ signiﬁcant on a α = 0.001 level, ∗∗ signiﬁcant
on a α = 0.01 level, ∗ signiﬁcant on a α = 0.05 level. Joined F-tests for both models
reject the hypothesis of insigniﬁcant coeﬃcients on an α = 0.001 level.
12no-noise noise
x0 0.03 0.15∗
(0.04) (0.07)
x1 0.83∗∗∗ 0.28∗
(0.06) (0.12)
x2 -0.03 0.30∗∗∗
(0.05) (0.1)
x3 -0.21
(0.14)
x4 0.35∗
(0.16)
x5 0.10∗ -0.06
(0.05) (0.09)
x6 −0.73∗
(0.35)
adj rsquare 0.77 0.34
Table 1: Regression results for equation (3) and (4)
we observe that commitments facilitate investments. Indeed, commit-
ments are positively reinforced. Investments for trustworthy signals in-
crease in the course of the experiment. To the contrary, the results under
the noise condition indicate little structured investment. Quite astonish-
ingly, here even trustworthy signals are only partially reinforced. Hence,
the mere existence of a noisy transmission mechanism shifts behavior
away from the equilibrium and lowers investments. Yet, even untrust-
worthy signals yield some positive payoﬀs. Clearly, the results contradict
the rational hypothesis, as well as the fairness hypothesis. As predicted
by the oﬀ-equilibrium hypothesis, random responses arise from experi-
ence with experiments. It seems that trustors invest less in order to avoid
reinforcing untrustworthy commitments. However, even the cautious in-
vestments of trustors are suﬃcient to reward those commitments. Figure
4 shows the experimentally observed average earnings for trustees, based
on submitted commitments.10 As one can see, rewards for commitments
under the noise condition do not punish untrustworthy commitments.
Consequently, a broad range of commitments is reinforced.
Another interesting ﬁnding is that the majority of trustees committed
to share the production equally, although theory predicts a ﬁrst-mover
10Earnings are clustered such that commitments on the ordinal axis represent the
midpoint of the class.
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Figure 4: Average earnings of trustees
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Figure 5: Eﬃciency in the course of the experiment
14advantage under both conditions. One can assume that trustees’ own
fairness concerns, as well as the anticipated fairness concerns of trustors,
lead to this behavior. Yet trustors responded quite diﬀerently to the dif-
ferent treatment conditions. While they responded rationally under the
no-noise condition, their response under the noise condition appeared
to be more random. It seems that the mere introduction of a potential
noisy mechanism leads to a generally lower average investment level, and
to a higher variability in trustors’ responses. However, these responses
reinforce untrustworthy commitments. As a consequence, trustors learn
to decrease investments even further in the course of the experiment.
Consequently, investment eﬃciency develops as shown in the next ﬁg-
ure. Figure 5 posits eﬃciency as a function of experience under the
noise and no-noise conditions. Since trustworthy signals are also only
partially rewarded when there are noisy commitments, in early periods
of the experiment the diﬀerent conditions do not result in diﬀerent levels
of eﬃciency. This result seems to support Hratio that both commitment
mechanisms facilitate eﬃciency. With experience, however, eﬃciency
increases under the no-noise condition as a response to reinforced trust-
worthy commitments, but it decreases under the noise condition due to
reinforced untrustworthy behavior. This eﬀect supports Hoff.11
5 Conclusion
Previous studies on commitments showed that accurate commitments
promote eﬃciency, both theoretically and experimentally (van Huyck et
al., 1995). The current data are consistent with this ﬁnding. However,
in some situations, one cannot be certain that early commitments will
be followed up. By examining the eﬀect of commitments in cases where
commitments are not necessarily accurate, the current study extends our
understanding of the eﬀect of early commitments on trade. We ﬁnd that
noise has a strong eﬀect on players investments in response to such com-
mitments and consequently on eﬃciency. With respect to the advantage
of committing parties predicted by theory, we can conclude that one’s
own fairness considerations, as well as the anticipated fairness consid-
erations of one’s counterparts, eliminate this strategic advantage. This
result is quite surprising since, for the context of the peasant-dictator
game with a commitment mechanism, fairness considerations cannot be
identiﬁed as having an important inﬂuence on the parties who have to in-
vest. Rather, we ﬁnd that peasants respond rationally, which is puzzling,
given the results of ultimatum bargaining. One possible explanation is
that this diﬀerence in behavior may be attributed to the fact that these
11p < 0.03 for the linear trend in each group; Mann-Whitney test, one-sided.
15games are framed diﬀerently.
Yet the diﬀerences between eﬃciency under the two conditions are
revealed only after some time. This ﬁnding is consistent with earlier
ﬁndings that games with similar equilibria, but diﬀerent oﬀ-equilibrium
incentives, elicit diﬀerent behavior since players’ behavior is reinforced
diﬀerently. Therefore, players who begin these game away from the equi-
librium may learn very diﬀerent things (Roth & Erev, 1995). The current
study shows that, when commitments are accurate, players learn to in-
teract eﬃciently. However, when commitments are noisy, investments
are lowered as a result of the introduction of a potentially noisy mech-
anism. Moreover, trustors cannot learn to diﬀerentiate between signals;
consequently, trustees do not learn to interact eﬃciently. Apparently,
inaccurate information impairs eﬃciency. Compared with accurate rec-
ommendations, tourist guides that rate the qualities of meals too high
do not enhance the proﬁts restaurants earn from tourists. Rather, they
harm the proﬁts of all restaurants, even cutting into the proﬁts of good
quality ones. The current analysis implies that positively biased recom-
mendations may facilitate eﬃciency only for a short time. However, in
the long run such recommendations might impair eﬃciency.
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18Appendix
A. Proof of Proposition 1
Proof Let us denote player A’s (B’s) payoﬀ as πA(a) (πB(b), respec-
tively).
Clearly, for every commitment b < 1
3 that is received by player A, a
simple comparison of payoﬀs πA for the choices a = 0 and a > 0 yields
πA(0) > πA(a), so that a is dominated.
For every b = 1
3, πA(1) = πA(a) for a < 1, so that player A is
indiﬀerent about this commitment.
Finally, for every b > 1
3, πA(1) > πA(a) for a < 1, so that a is
dominated.
Thus, player A’s best response is full investment if the commitment
exceeds 1
3, and non-investment if the commitment falls below 1
3. Player
B’s decision problem is to choose b, which maximizes her payoﬀ. As-
suming common knowledge of rationality, a simple comparison of payoﬀs
yields πB(b) < πB(b) < πB(b0) for 0 ≤ b < 1
3, 1
3 < b ≤ 1, and b0 = 1
3. Of
course, πB(b) = 0 and, deﬁning without any loss of generality b := 1
3 +ε,
πB(b) = (2
3 − ε)3IA < 2
33IA = πB(b0), based on A’s best responses.
B. Proof of Proposition 2
Recall that sequential rational belief formation requires, for both
players A and B, belief vectors e ga and e gb, respectively, which characterize
the probabilities for all types of games consistent with their information
partitions.
Proof Since noise in our commitment mechanism is only a potential
positive deviation, e ga(b < 1
3|sba < 1
3) = 1. Also e ga(b < sba|sba < β) = 0,
while e ga(b = sba|sba < β) = 1. Thus, referring to proposition 1, A’s
best responds to sba < 1
3 by choosing a = 0, and she best respond
to sba = s0
ba such that 1
3 ≤ s0
ba < β if she chooses a = 1. Likewise,
e ga(b < 1
3|sba > 1
3+β) = 0, while e ga(b > 1
3|sba > 1
3+β) = 1. Consequently,
A chooses a = 1 for sba > 1
3 + β. Therefore, e gb(a = 1|b = b0) = 1 for
b0 ≥ 1
3 + β, and e gb(a = 1|b = b00) = 1 for 1
3 ≤ b00 < β.
For any b = b in 0 ≤ b < 1
3, player B entertains e gb(a = 1|b = b,sba =
s0
ba) := Λ0, where s0
ba = b+β. To the contrary, e gb(a = 1|b = b,sba = b) =
0. For any b = b in β ≤ b < 1
3 + β, player B entertains e gb(a = 1|b =
b,sba = b) := Λ00. To the contrary, e gb(a = 1|b = b,sba = b + β) = 1.
Notice that Λ := Λ0 = Λ00 for b+β = b since player A cannot diﬀerentiate
among the two cases.
A comparison of expected payoﬀs of player B shows that E(π(b))
dominates E(π(b)) if 1 − b − β − βΛ < 0, thus, if b ≤ 1 − 2β E(π(b))
dominates E(π(b)) for all Λ ∈ [0,1]. Since E(πA(1|b)) > E(πA(0|b)) ∀b,
19player A, receiving s0
ba for β ≤ s0
ba ≤ 1−β, optimally chooses a = 1 with
probability one.
However, for b > 1 − 2β for Λ >
1−b−β
β , one ﬁnds that E(πB(b))
dominates E(πB(b)), while E(πB(b)) dominates E(πB(b)) for Λ ≤
1−b−β
β .
Since E(πA(b)) > E(πA(b)) ∀b, player A, receiving s00
ba for 1−β < s00
ba <
1
3 + β, optimally chooses a = 1 with probability
1−b−β
β and a = 0 with
probability
2β+b−1
β .
C. Proof of Proposition 3
Proof Referring to proposition 2, we know that A best responds to
sba = s0
ba such that 1
3 ≤ s0
ba < β by choosing a = 1; it follows with respect
to proposition 1 argmaxb00 E(πB(b00)) = 1
3. Hence, simple calculations of
expected payoﬀs yields E(πB(b0)) = (1 − b0)3IA < 2IA = E(πB(1
3)) for
b0 ≥ 1
3 + β. Likewise, E(πB(b)) = 3IA[1
2Λ(1 − b) + 1
2(1 − b)] < 2IA for
β ≤ b < 1
3 + β. Finally, E(πB(b)) = 1
2Λ(1 − b)3IA < 2IA for 0 ≤ b < 1
3.
D. Instructions for player A12
In this experiment, you will play six diﬀerent games against diﬀerent
players. In all the games, you will be player A. Each game involves two
players. For each game, you’ll be endowed with 12 Sheqels. You are
asked to decide how much of this amount you will transfer to player B
and how much you will keep for yourself. You may transfer any inte-
ger between 0 (transfer nothing) and 12 (transfer the whole amount).
The amount transferred is multiplied by 3. Then, you will get back the
amount that B decides to return. To make your decision easier, player
B will send you a signal at the beginning of the game with the pro-
portion that he commits to return from the amount that you will send.
The amount that B returns will be the committed proportion from the
multiplied transferred amount.
The signal that you’ll receive is not always accurate. There is a 50%
chance that the signal will be the proportion that B has committed to
return. However, there is a 50% chance that the signal will be the true
proportion, plus 0.4. Signals that exceed 1 will be presented as signals
of 1.13
Your earnings will be the amount that you keep for yourself, plus
the amount that B sends back. B’s earnings will be the amount that he
keeps for himself. At the end of the experiment (after the six games),
one game will be randomly selected. The payment from this game will
be your earnings for the experiment. Good luck.
12We present the English translation of the instructions for the noise condition;
deviations in the no-noise treatment are indicated by footnotes.
13This paragraph is missing under the no-noise condition.
20E. Instructions for player B
In this experiment, you will play six diﬀerent games against diﬀerent
players. In all games, you will be player B. Each game involves two
players. In each game, player A receives 12 Sheqels. He is asked to
decide how much of that amount to send you. Player A is allowed to
transfer any integer number between 0 (to transfer nothing) and 12 (to
transfer the whole amount). The amount transferred is multiplied by
3. At the beginning of the game (before A makes his decision), you are
asked to send a commitment to player A about the proportion of the
amount sent that you will return to A. You may choose any proportion
between 0 (to return nothing) and 1 (to return the whole amount).
The signal that is received by A regarding your commitment is not
always accurate. There is a 50% chance that A will receive a signal that
is the true proportion. However, there is 50% chance that A will receive
a signal that is the true proportion, plus 0.4. Signals that exceed 1 will
be presented as signals of 1.14
The amount that B returns to player A will be the committed pro-
portion from the multiplied transferred amount. Your earnings will be
the amount that you receive, minus the amount that you send back to
player A. A’s earnings will be the amount that he keeps for himself, plus
the amount that you return. At the end of the experiment (after the
six games), one game will be randomly selected. The payment for this
game will be your earnings for the experiment. Good luck.
14This paragraph is missing under the no-noise condition.
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